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1 
 
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
This brief is filed on behalf of the undersigned 
Law Professors identified in Appendix A and AARP.1   
 
Law Professors teach and write about patents, 
intellectual property, health, science, and constitu-
tional law.  Law Professors are concerned that the 
Patent Act should be construed consistently with: (1) 
the constitutional premise that the patent system 
does not authorize private ownership of scientific 
principles, natural materials and abstract ideas; and 
(2) historic enforcement of that premise by requiring 
invention to exist in the application of any science, 
nature, and ideas. 
 
AARP is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization 
that helps people over the age of 50 to have indepen-
dence, choice and control in ways that are beneficial 
to them and society as a whole.  AARP has nearly 40 
million members.   AARP works to foster the health 
and economic security of individuals as they age, to 
ensure access to high quality and economical health 
care, and to ensure that older people have viable 
retirement options.  AARP has previously filed briefs 
in this Court on the limits of what is patent eligible.  
In Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabo-
lite Laboratories, Inc., No. 04-607, AARP described 
the adverse effects of patents for natural phenomena 
                                                     
1 Letters of the Parties’ general consent to file amicus briefs 
are on file with the Court.  This brief was not authored in 
whole or in part by counsel for any party.  No one other than 
Amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution to 
preparing or submitting this brief. 
  
 
 
 
 
2 
claimed as medical diagnostic methods.  AARP has 
an interest in this case because of the trend to find 
“business methods” that are abstract ideas applied 
without any invention to be patent eligible.  Such 
methods, including retirement plan methods, strate-
gies and designs, limit the retirement options avail-
able to older people.  Granting such patents also 
increases the cost of retirement plans and may lead 
to misconceptions that particular plans are govern-
ment approved or legitimate.  Upholding the patent 
eligibility of the claimed business method in this 
case would likely open the gates to patents on non-
inventive applications of science and nature, which 
would adversely affect medical research and diag-
nostic and treatment options.  Patent incentives are 
not needed for such discoveries or applications. 
 
Science, nature, and ideas (claimed as such or 
without invention in their application) for centuries 
consistently have been held to be excluded from the 
patent system.  Accordingly, the patent system 
generally has promoted scientific and technological 
development for human benefit.  A broad interpreta-
tion of the Patent Act that would authorize the 
eligibility of non-inventive applications of science, 
nature, or ideas would extend the patent system 
beyond the limits that Congress has approved and 
would raise serious constitutional conflicts that 
should be avoided.  It would also threaten continued 
scientific, technological, and other advances.  Amici 
urge the Court to avoid this result. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
 The patent system of the United States, like 
that of other countries, excludes from its ambit 
scientific principles, natural materials, and abstract 
ideas.  Since the 19th Century, this Court has distin-
guished patentable inventions from ineligible disco-
veries of science, nature, and ideas by determining 
whether there is any invention in their application, 
i.e., any creative, technological advance beyond 
merely applying the newly discovered or previously 
known science, nature, and ideas to a particular 
context.  The “invention in the application” test of 
eligibility: performs a necessary gate-keeping role 
that is distinct from the patentability criteria of 
novelty, non-obviousness, and adequacy of disclo-
sure; explains this Court’s machine or transforma-
tion precedents and why particularity or tangibility 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
eligibility; and elucidates why the claims at issue 
here are ineligible.  These claims are non-inventive 
applications of the abstract idea of hedging the risks 
of fixed-price, variable-volume purchases, limited 
only to the field of commodities. 
 
Neither the Constitution nor the Patent Act 
authorizes patents for non-inventive applications of 
public domain science, nature, and ideas.  The 
Constitution authorizes exclusive rights only for 
“Discoveries” of “Inventors,” and the Patent Act has 
consistently been interpreted to preclude patents for 
scientific, natural, or conceptual discoveries, claimed 
as such or without invention in their application.  
The 1952 Act’s definitional changes did not alter this 
requirement.  Interpreting Section 101 (alone or 
  
 
 
 
 
4 
with Section 273(b)) to authorize such claims would 
raise serious Constitutional conflicts that should be 
avoided.  Such patents would not be for “Discoveries” 
of “Inventors,” would extend beyond the “useful Arts” 
and would impede rather than “Promote the 
Progress” as they would propertize the building 
blocks of science, technology and other learning.  
Such patents are and should remain prohibited. 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. For a Claim Applying Science,   
Nature, or Ideas to Be Eligible, 
There Must Be Invention in the 
Application. 
 
This case raises the most basic question of pa-
tent law: what kinds of discoveries or inventions can 
be protected by the patent system?  The patent 
system does not exist to provide incentives for all 
forms of creative human endeavor.  That its reach is 
limited avoids burdening the patent system with 
non-technological activities or discoveries, such as 
literary, artistic, and other non-functional expres-
sions protected by copyright.2  More significantly, 
the limits on the patent system avoid burdening 
society by propertizing fundamental knowledge and 
pre-existing natural materials.  Thus, it is a common 
premise that patent systems may not authorize 
private ownership of “‘“[a] principle in the abstract,” 
...  [p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, 
                                                     
2 Cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99, 101-03 (1879) 
(discussing limits to the copyright system and its relation to the 
patent system). 
  
 
 
 
 
5 
mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts 
... as they are the basic tools of scientific and tech-
nological work.’”3 
 
Discoveries of phenomena of nature are unpa-
tentable under two foundational premises: (1) they 
are not themselves the products of human invention, 
regardless of the investments and creative efforts 
leading to their identification; and (2) the patent 
system must not subject such discoveries to private 
property rights because they should be free for all 
humanity to share.4  Discoveries of phenomena of 
                                                     
3 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 591-92 (1978) (quoting 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting Le Roy v. 
Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853))).  See, e.g., Conven-
tion on the Grant of European Patents (“EPC”), arts. 
52(2)(a)&(c), Oct. 5, 1973 (as amended), 13 I.L.M. 268 (“discove-
ries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;” and 
“schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, 
playing games or doing business, and programs for computers” 
are not patentable inventions); Patent Law of the Peoples 
Republic of China, arts. 25(1)&(2), translation at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/2008
04/t20080416_380327.html; Patents Act, 1970 (India) (as 
amended), § 3(c), available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ 
ipr/patent/patents.htm. 
 
4 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“‘free to 
all men and reserved exclusively to none’”) (quoting Funk Bros. 
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).  See 
generally 17 The Parliamentary History of England col. 999 
(William Cobbett ed., 1806-20) (1774) (Lord Camden) (“science 
and learning” are by nature “common to all mankind” and 
“ought to be as free and general as air or water.”) (“Parliamen-
tary History”); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of 
the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (pt. 3 continued), 77 
J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 847, 855 (1995) (“Walterscheid, 
Antecedents”).  
  
 
 
 
 
6 
nature thus are not “Discoveries” of “Inventors” 
within the Constitution’s grant of authority.5  Al-
though abstract intellectual concepts may be human 
creations,6 they are also outside the patent system.  
Such patents would restrict the public’s right to 
                                                     
5 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (stating that “discovery 
is something less than invention”); Anthony W. Deller, The 
United States patent system, in Mainly on patents:  The use of 
industrial property and its literature 50-52 (Felix Liebesny ed., 
1972) (distinguishing “‘mere discovery’” from invention) 
(quoting Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 882 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865)); Edward C. Walterscheid, The 
Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Histori-
cal Perspective 350, 356 (William S. Hein & Co. 2002) (noting 
that the Framers appeared to view “Discoveries” and “Inven-
tors” to be synonymous, and that under English common law 
patents “did not cover principles of nature”) (“Walterscheid, 
Study”); id. at 365-66, 375-76 (arguing that “Discoveries” of 
“Inventors” are limited to the “useful arts,” which  excludes 
“anything not made or created by man”).  See also Linda J. 
Demaine and Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double 
Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the 
Biotechnology Patent, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 303, 370-74 (2002) 
(discussing historical evidence that patentable discoveries did 
not include “merely something found”). 
 
6 Because all patent claims are intellectual concepts expressed 
in language having physical embodiments, they could be 
viewed as “abstract ideas.”  See, e.g., Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 386 (1996); Walterscheid, 
Antecedents, supra, at 849 (describing how disclosure of the 
concept of the invention became the consideration for the 
patent grant).  This raises a level of generality problem regard-
ing which human-created ideas are the fundamental tools for 
further innovation that must be in the public domain upon 
their disclosure.  In contrast, all discoveries of science and 
nature must be so treated. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
7 
benefit immediately from the discoverer’s disclo-
sure.7  Therefore, all patent systems must distin-
guish claims to unpatentable discoveries of scientific 
principles, naturally occurring materials, and ab-
stract ideas (“science, nature, and ideas”) from 
claims to patent-eligible human inventions.8  Line 
drawing to separate patentable inventions from 
unpatentable discoveries is necessary to protect the 
public domain.9 
                                                     
7 See, e.g., 1 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents for 
Useful Inventions 37-44 (Little, Brown 1890).  See also id. at 44 
(“methods of agriculture and commerce, the metaphysical and 
moral truths, and all other inventions which do not relate to 
the industrial arts, belong at once, upon their publication, to all 
mankind”). 
 
8 In foreign systems, such line drawing may occur in legislative 
or judicial definitions of “invention,” in requirements for 
“technical effect” in claimed applications of science, nature, or 
ideas, or in requirements for “industrial applicability.”  See, 
e.g., Patent Act (Japan), art. 2(1), translation at 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/PA.pdf; European 
Patent Office, Revision of the European Patent Convention 
(EPC 2000) Synoptic Presentation of EPC 1973/2000 – Part I: 
The Articles, EPO Official J. 48 (Spec. Ed. 4 2007), available at 
http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj007/08_07/special_edition_4_e
pc_2000_synoptic.pdf; Patent Cooperation Treaty, art. 33(4), 
June 19, 1970 (as amended), 28 U.S.T. 7645.  See generally 
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New United States Patent Act in the 
Light of Comparative Law I, 102 U. Penn. L. Rev. 291, 302 
(1954).  
 
9 Similar concerns animate the copyright doctrine of merger, 
which precludes protection for an author’s expression if it 
“would effectively accord protection to the idea itself,” because 
“ideas are too important to the advancement of knowledge to 
permit them to be under private ownership.”  CCC Info. Servs., 
Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Repts., Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 69 (2d 
  
 
 
 
 
8 
In the United States, this Court has drawn a 
consistent line when interpreting the statutory 
categories of patentable subject matter.10  The Court 
has required invention to exist in the application of 
any previously known or newly discovered science, 
nature, or ideas.11  “‘If there is to be invention from 
such a discovery, it must come from the application 
of the law of nature to a new and useful end.’”12  
Moreover, the invention (i.e., the creative, technolo-
gical advance13) must reside in the application, 
rather than in a discovery preceding or employed by 
it.14  This is because the science, nature, or ideas 
                                                     
Cir. 1994); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d 
Cir. 1991).  See Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 103. 
 
10 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“any … process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter”). 
 
11 “Application” here refers not to the document submitted, but 
to the implementation made of science, nature, and ideas, e.g., 
improving steam engines employing thermodynamic principles.  
See Boulton v. Bull, 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 652-53 (1795) 
 
12 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 n.11 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co., 
333 U.S. at 130). 
 
13See, e.g., 1 Robinson, supra, at 93-94 (surveying legal efforts 
to define “invention”).  
 
14 See, e.g., Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 
306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (“We assume, without deciding the point, 
that this advance was invention even though it was achieved by 
the logical application of a known scientific law to a familiar 
type of antenna.”) (emphasis added); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 
1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Archer, C.J., dissenting) 
(“The requirement of the patent law that an invention or 
discovery reside in the application of an abstract idea, law of 
  
 
 
 
 
9 
must be treated as if they are already in the prior 
art, i.e., are publicly known and free for all to use.15  
Absent invention in applying such discoveries, there 
is simply no invention to patent. 
 
To emphasize this point, this Court in Parker 
v. Flook stated that “the discovery of such a pheno-
menon cannot support a patent unless there is some 
other inventive concept in its application.”16 There, 
the claimed process for catalytic conversion of hydro-
carbons “contain[ed] no claim of patentable inven-
tion,” because the only creative advance was an 
improved mathematical method of calculating a 
process variable, which had to be treated as if it 
were already known.  The mere application of the 
new math in the context of the hydrocarbon process 
was not a technological invention (any more than 
would be using a new mathematical formula to 
calculate a useful measurement).17  The need for 
another, and an inventive, concept in the claimed 
application of any scientific, natural, or conceptual 
discovery is critical, because the patent system does 
not exist to reward scientific, natural, or conceptual 
                                                     
nature, principle, or natural phenomenon is embodied in the 
language of 35 U.S.C. § 101”) (emphasis in original). 
 
15 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Flook, 437 U.S. at 592 
(citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 115 (1853)). 
 
16 Flook, 439 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added). 
 
17 See id.  at 594-95. 
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endeavors, but to create incentives for invention.18  
The Constitution and Section 101 thus bar the gate 
to non-inventive, piecemeal incursions on the public 
domain of science, nature, and ideas, even though 
the claimed applications may be new and do not 
foreclose other applications. 
 
A. The Invention in the Application 
Test Performs a Necessary Gate-
Keeping Role, Different from 
Novelty, Non-Obviousness, and 
Adequacy of Disclosure. 
 
As this Court has held and should reiterate 
here, the invention in the application test of eligibili-
ty pertains to all product and process claims,19 even 
though the literal language of Section 101 is broad.20  
Moreover, the test pertains even though the claimed 
application of science, nature, or ideas is wholly new 
under Section 102.21  If novelty were all that was 
required for eligibility, this Court’s precedents would 
                                                     
18 See, e.g., Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification 
of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 32 J. Pat. Off. 
Soc’y 83, 87 (1950). 
 
19 See. e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 n.11 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. 
at 68); Flook, 437 U.S. at 600 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 
20 See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 (Benson “foreclose[d] a 
purely literal reading of § 101.”). 
 
21 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
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have reached very different results.22  Rather, the 
test pertains to newly created things and activities, 
whether or not the science, nature, or idea employed 
by the claimed invention was previously known.23   
 
This Court has held that eligibility test per-
tains when “consider[ing the claims] as a whole”24 
and without “dissect[ing] the claims into old and new 
elements.”25  Rather than requiring analysis of 
which elements or steps of the claims are new, the 
test requires identifying the kind of discovery or 
invention made.  One must still determine what (if 
anything) the invention consists of, to assure that 
the claim as a whole contains a technological ad-
vance relative to the public domain science, nature, 
and ideas on which it relies.26 
                                                     
22 See. e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130-31 (although 
Bond “made a new and different composition.… we think that 
that [the claimed, novel] aggregation of species fell short of 
invention within the meaning of the patent statutes”); Flook, 
437 U.S. at 588 (refusing to find the claim eligible where 
novelty existed, but only in using a new mathematical formula 
in “an otherwise conventional method”).  Cf. Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 448 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (“Here, by contrast, the 
patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature....”) (emphasis added). 
 
23 See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 591-92 (“[T]he novelty of the 
mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all.”). 
 
24 Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.  See id. at 588. 
 
25 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188.   
 
26 Some amici make this point in the particularly troubling 
context of claims for which the only advance resides in a claim 
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The invention in the application test also per-
tains without considering the qualitative degree of 
any advance, beyond what was previously known in 
the art, to determine if a patent is warranted.  That 
is the subject of non-obviousness analysis under 
Section 103.27  Although Section 103 could be used 
to exclude claims for non-inventive applications of 
science, nature, and ideas,28 it is not an effective 
substitute for Section 101.   
                                                     
step requiring performance of a mental act, with information 
that the patent itself discloses.  See, e.g., Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Law Professor Kevin Emerson Collins at 1-8.  But the 
invention in the application test is not limited to that context.  
Other amici suggest that the discovery of a previously existing, 
unexpected property provides for eligibility so long as the 
claimed application (as a whole) is new and useful.  See, e.g., 
Brief of Amici Curiae 20 Law and Business Professors at 3.  
But such a discovery is unpatentable and must be treated as if 
it were publicly known.  For eligibility, there must be another, 
and inventive, concept beyond merely using that property. 
 
27 35 U.S.C. § 103.  See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 
(11 How.) 248, 265 (1851); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 
192, 200 (1883).  See generally Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost 
of the “Invention” Requirement, 1 APLA Q.J. 26, 29-34 (1972-
73) (noting that a qualitative “invention” requirement is 
reflected in the Constitution’s restriction to “Inventors”; 
discussing the history of the invention standard preceding and 
following Hotchkiss, and the legislative effort to establish in 
Section 103 a clearer qualitative standard by reference to 
“unobviousness” of the “subject matter as a whole”); Walter-
scheid, Study, supra, at 335-44 (discussing arguments for a 
qualitative invention standard in the Constitution). 
 
28 See, e.g., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976).  
Because science, nature, and ideas must be treated as if 
publicly known, for any non-obvious invention to exist in a 
claim applying such discoveries it must exist in the application. 
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Section 101 provides clear public notice that 
the public domain of science, nature, and ideas is 
outside the boundaries of the patent system.  The 
gate-keeping role of Section 101 minimizes burdens 
on the patent system, by barring all claims lacking 
any invention in the application.29  Section 101 thus 
poses a less complicated and less resource-intensive 
initial analysis than patentability evaluations under 
Section 103.  The Section 101 analysis usually can be 
made on the face of the specification, because its 
disclosure must explain the nature of the invention.  
The disclosure enables a threshold decision on 
eligibility,30 before engaging in costly judicial or 
administrative fact-finding and qualitative legal 
evaluation of sufficiency of the advance under Sec-
tion 103.31  The focus on legal sufficiency also masks 
                                                     
29 Some amici argue that patentability doctrines, such as 
novelty, obviousness, and utility can weed out “bad” patents, 
and that yet other doctrines such as declaratory challenges and 
restrictions on injunctive relief can minimize their adverse 
effects.  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae 20 Law and Business 
Professors at 25-30.  But none of these doctrines provide the 
threshold, gate-keeping benefits of Section 101 by avoiding 
such harms categorically. 
 
30 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89; id. at 213 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 
31 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 
(1966) (discussing the required factual analyses, including 
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art and 
the level of skill in the art, and noting that the “ultimate 
question … is one of law”); KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 
U.S. 398, 416, 427 (2007) (discussing the reasons for the 
obviousness requirement, which “is a legal determination”). 
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the clarity of public notice regarding the limits of the 
patent system, impeding the development of rules of 
exclusion that can provide private guidance. 
 
Further, the invention in the application test 
pertains without considering the correlation between 
the claimed advance disclosed and the breadth of 
exclusive rights granted.  That is the subject of the 
written description and enablement requirements of 
Section 112, first paragraph.32  Applicants do not 
create the science or nature that they discover, and 
are not entitled to claim them, abstract ideas, or 
non-inventive applications thereof.33  This is true 
even when the claimed applications (and thus the 
exclusive rights) are limited in scope, are capable of 
being made and used, and are sufficiently described.  
Thus, Section 101 performs a role that Section 112 
cannot.  In contrast, ineligible claims for non-
                                                     
32 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1. 
 
33 See, e.g., O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113 (“In fine he claims an 
exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not 
described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not 
describe when he obtained his patent.”) (emphasis added).  Cf. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 311-12 (noting that before 1930 
artificially bred plants were thought to be products of nature 
and incapable of an adequate written description, and that the 
Plant Patent Act changed the view of their status and relaxed 
the written description requirement); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 133-35 (2001) 
(same, noting that the Plant Patent Act was not meant to 
exclude plant protection under the predecessor to Section 101, 
even though they were not then thought to fall within that 
provision). 
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inventive applications of science, nature and ideas 
also may conflict with Section 112 requirements.34 
 
The invention in the application test cannot be 
evaded by adding non-inventive limits that restrict 
the scope of claims, even if doing so necessarily 
avoids preempting all possible uses of previously 
known or newly discovered science, nature, and 
ideas.35  Artful drafting of field-of-use restrictions, 
insignificant additional structures, trivial physical 
transformations, or other non-inventive claim limita-
tions may reflect legal skill, but does not impart 
patent eligibility.36  Such limits may restrict scope, 
                                                     
34 See, e.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 
U.S. 245, 257 (1928) (“That the patentee may not by claiming a 
patent on the result or function of a machine extend his patent 
to devices or mechanisms not described in the patent is well 
understood.”).  See generally Joshua D. Sarnoff, Shaking the 
Foundations of Patentable Subject Matter 61-63 (unpublished 
draft Apr. 2008) (discussing how the 1836 Patent Act’s re-
quirement for clear claims provided another doctrinal basis for 
excluding patents on natural discoveries, by prohibiting 
overbreadth and abstractness), at http://www.wcl.american. 
edu/pijip/go/research-and-advocacy/ip-policy-and-law-reform. 
 
35 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 n.14 (“The claims [in Flook], 
however, did not cover every conceivable application of the 
formula.  We rejected in Flook the argument that because all 
possible uses of the mathematical formula were not pre-
empted, the claim should be eligible for patent protection.”).  
Cf. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 n.11 (“it is not entirely clear why a 
process claim is any more or less patentable because the 
specific end use contemplated is the only one for which the 
algorithm has any practical application”). 
 
36 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590; 
Benson, 409 U.S. at 70, 72. 
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but add “nothing ... of significance” to the otherwise 
patent-ineligible discovery.37 
 
The Court of Appeals below, however, focused 
on this Court’s dicta in Benson and Diehr to high-
light “[t]he question” of whether the claim would 
“pre-empt substantially all” applications of science, 
nature, and ideas.38  But as this Court held in 
Dolbear v. American Bell Telegraph Co.,39 preemp-
tion is not the right question.  After describing Bell’s 
patented “discovery” and “art” as a particular me-
thod of placing electric current in a specific condition 
for use in sound transmission,40 the Court held that 
the invention was a pioneering (i.e., a highly inven-
tive) application of the principles of electromagnet-
ism, limited to the particular process claimed.  The 
Court then noted that the claim would not be invalid 
                                                     
37 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 
U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal as 
improvidently granted) (also noting restrictions on the claim’s 
scope and physical transformations in performing the process).  
See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71 (referring to such artful claim 
drafting as “direct attempts” to claim computer programs).  Cf. 
EPC, supra, art. 52(3) (prohibiting eligibility of excluded 
categories “as such”). 
 
38 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).  
See id. at 952-53 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72, and Diehr, 
450 U.S. at 187-88). 
 
39 126 U.S. 1 (1888). 
 
40 Id. at 534-35. 
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even if it were the only way to accomplish the re-
sult—and thus would preempt all ways of doing so.41 
 
The Court should clarify here that preemption 
is not the test for patent eligibility.  Claims that limit 
scope but lack invention in the application of science, 
nature or ideas necessarily avoid preemption.  
Rather, preemption is the consequence of improperly 
claiming science, nature, or ideas without invention 
in the application and without any other significant 
limits on the scope of application of such a discovery.   
 
B. Particularity or Tangibility, Which 
Is Required by the Machine or 
Transformation Precedents, Is 
Insufficient Without Invention in 
the Application. 
 
The invention in the application test explains 
the proper application of this Court’s precedents 
regarding patent eligibility for process claims tied to 
a machine (or other structure) or that result in a 
physical transformation.  This Court has referred to 
the machine and transformation precedents as “the 
clue” to patent eligibility, and the Court of Appeals 
below elevated them (at least for now) to an exclu-
                                                     
41 See id. at 535 (“It may be that … practically, his patent 
gives him its exclusive use for that purpose….  It will, if true, 
show more clearly the great importance of his discovery, but it 
will not invalidate his patent.”).  See also In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 
397 F.2d 856, 860 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (en banc); id. at 869 (Kirkpa-
trick, J., dissenting). 
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sive test of eligibility.42  However, merely tying a 
process claim to some specific machine or having 
some kind of tangible effect will not impart eligibility 
without invention in the application.  The same is 
true for claims in the other subject matter catego-
ries, which also recite particular things or have 
tangible effects when used.43 
 
For the first century of American patent law, 
doubts were initially expressed about, and later this 
Court explicitly prohibited, claiming processes that 
were not restricted to particular physical machines 
or implementing structures.44  This was because 
patents for processes that were not limited to partic-
ular, invented structures would claim scientific 
principles or abstract ideas (specific results) without 
any invention in their application.45 
                                                     
42 Benson, 409 U.S. at 64, 70 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 
U.S. (4 Otto) 780, 787-88 (1876).  See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954, 
956. 
 
43 Cf. Brief for the Respondent at 36 n.14 (the machine-or-
transformation test is separate from the preemption test). 
 
44 See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 517 (1818) 
(Story, J., App. Note II, On the Patent Laws); O’Reilly, 56 U.S. 
(15 How.) at 116, 119; and Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 
How.) 252, 268-69 (1853).  See also Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 
1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568); Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. 
Cas. 914, 923 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1,047); Wyeth v. Stone, 
30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107); Howe v. 
Abbott, 12 F. Cas. 656, 657-58 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 6,766).  
See generally Sarnoff, supra, at 63-83.   
 
45 Corning thus held that process claims were invalid when 
they exceeded the disclosed modes (or machines) for 
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 This Court first authorized patents for inven-
tive processes that were not limited to the disclosed 
physical means for accomplishing a result (or to 
similar machines or structures operating on the 
same principles) in Cochrane v. Deener.46  For patent 
eligibility of a process that was not tied to a particu-
lar machine, however, Cochrane required that it 
must be “a mode of treatment of certain materials to 
produce a given result.  It is an act, or a series of 
acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be trans-
formed and reduced to a different state or thing....  
The process requires that certain things should be 
done with certain substances....”47   
 
Thus, after Cochrane, patent eligibility for 
processes could be found when the claim reflected 
invention either: (1) in the particular machine (or 
structure) implementing a discovery, rather than in 
a non-inventive application performed with any or 
with no machine; or (2) by transforming certain 
substances, which were understood as tangible 
                                                     
implementing them.  See 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 269 (“His patent 
having a title which claims a machine, and his specification 
describing a machine, to construe his claim as for the function, 
effect, or result of his machine, would certainly endanger, if not 
destroy, its validity.”).  Similarly, O’Reilly held that “the patent 
was not supported because this [scientific] principle [of using 
electromagnetism] was embodied in it....  [I]t was supported, 
because he had invented a mechanical apparatus.”  56 U.S. (15 
How.) at 116.  See id. at 119 (“by the use of certain means”). 
 
46 94 U.S. (4 Otto) at 787-88. 
 
47 Id. at 788 (emphasis added). 
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objects.48  But even for physical or chemical trans-
formations, invention was still required in the appli-
cation of scientific principles.  Applying an old 
process or structure to a new but analogous sub-
stance or use may have employed a particular ma-
chine or applied to a tangible object.  But it did not 
constitute invention, and such claims were not 
patent eligible.49 
                                                     
48 See, e.g., 1 Robinson, supra, at 178–79 (explaining that 
mental operations are not complete inventive acts, as they 
cannot produce physical effects, and thus are “neither ‘a thing 
made,’ nor ‘a manner of making’”); Giles S. Rich, The Relation 
between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. 
Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 159, 171 (1942) (explaining that 
for an invention—“a product of the mind”—“[t]o be patentable 
it must be capable of being embodied in a tangible form as an 
article of manufacture, machine, device or composition of 
matter or as a method or process which can be carried out by 
physical means”). 
 
49 See, e.g., Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Elec. Supply Co., 
144 U.S. 11, 18 (1892) (“[N]othing is better settled in this court 
than that the application of an old process to a new and 
analogous purpose does not involve invention, even if the new 
result had not before been contemplated.”) (emphasis added); 
Howe, 12 F. Cas. at 658 (“The application of an old process to 
manufacture an article, to which it had never before been 
applied, is not a patentable invention.  There must be some 
new process, or some new machinery used, to produce the 
result.”).  The premise for this approach was the belief that all 
uses (even those not contemplated) were inherent in the 
inventive principle of a machine or a process, and only the first 
inventor of the thing or process was entitled to a patent.  In 
contrast, non-analogous uses involved a different inventive 
principle, and thus the new uses or application to new things 
could be patented.  See Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 144 U.S. 
at 18–19.  See also 1 Robinson, supra, at 119–23.  But cf. In re 
Thuau, 135 F.2d 344, 347 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (holding that all new 
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Following Cochrane and Dolbear, disputes 
raged through the next century regarding the validi-
ty of claims to the function of a disclosed machine 
(i.e., an effect or result), which would extend process 
or structure claims beyond the disclosed uses or 
machines to other uses or machines.50  But these 
cases addressed claim scope rather than eligibility.  
The patents at issue disclosed particular machines 
reflecting invention in the application, but the claims 
covered all processes or machines for accomplishing 
the same result.51 
 
In sum, this Court’s precedents require for the 
eligibility of process claims either particular imple-
menting structures (machines) or application to 
certain tangible substances (transformations).  But 
under these precedents, particularity or tangibility 
were necessary, not sufficient, conditions for eligibil-
ity; by particular machines and tangible substances 
were meant inventive applications.52  That a claim 
                                                     
uses are not a new “art” under the statute, and might make 
vendors secondarily liable based on their customers’ activities). 
 
50 See, e.g., Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d at 858–65 (citing, inter 
alia, Risdon Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68 (1894), 
Westingthouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537 (1897), 
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1908), and 
Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20 (1934)). 
 
51 Later cases held that Risdon Locomotive Works should not 
be understood as prohibiting all mechanical process patents.  
See, e.g., Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d at 863 (citations omitted). 
 
52 Morse’s claim to a symbolic code “for telegraphic purposes” 
is not to the contrary.  O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 86.  See supra note 
45.  That claim need not be construed as untethered to the 
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requires the use of a particular machine or applica-
tion to a specific, tangible substance may not make 
the application inventive.  Recent decisions of the 
Court of Appeals have failed to recognize the need 
for invention in applications of discoveries using 
particular machines or achieving tangible transfor-
mations.53  Similarly, recent decisions have impro-
perly focused on what the information generated 
represents, rather than on what the invention is.54 
 
C. The Claims At Issue Are Ineligible, 
Non-Inventive Applications of an 
Abstract Idea. 
 
In the instant case, the Court must determine 
whether there is invention in the application of an 
                                                     
disclosed, inventive telegraph machine for its use.  Even if it 
were so construed, there may have been invention in the 
claimed, particular application of the abstract idea of using 
symbols to transmit information.  But in that case, machines or 
transformations may be unnecessary as well as insufficient. 
 
53 See, e.g.,State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Finan-
cial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 
Prometheus Labs, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., Appeal No. 
2008-1403, 2009 WL 2950232, at *8 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2009).  
Respondent similarly fails to appreciate this point.  See Brief 
for the Respondent at 40 (suggesting that a physical transfor-
mation in an assaying step is sufficient for eligibility of a 
medical diagnostic process applying a discovered phenomenon). 
 
54 Compare Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544, and Arrhythmia Re-
search Technology Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 
1059–61 (Fed.Cir.1992), with In re Abele, 864 F.2d 902, 907–09 
(C.C.P.A. 1982), In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795–96 (C.C.P.A. 
1982), and In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839–40 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
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“abstract idea.”  In Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. How-
ard,55 this Court explained what was meant by an 
abstract idea.  After analyzing the specification, the 
Court determined that the claim was for a pencil 
eraser (without the pencil and not limited to a par-
ticular shape) having a cavity smaller than a pencil 
to elastically hold the eraser onto a pencil.  But the 
public already possessed general knowledge of the 
elasticity of erasers and of putting things into elastic 
eraser cavities.  Thus, the only thing “left for this 
patentee” (i.e., the only valid claim to creative ad-
vance) was the specific idea that if one inserts a 
pencil into a smaller rubber cavity the rubber will 
cling to the pencil.56  The Court then noted that “an 
idea of itself is not patentable” and held that the 
claimed eraser—the “new device by which it [the 
unpatentable idea that the elastic property of rubber 
is triggered when a pencil is inserted] may be made 
practically useful” —was not new (and thus was not 
inventive).57  The Court thereby identified the 
unpatentable “abstract idea” as either a property of 
rubber (elasticity) or a result that was sought (bind-
ing to pencils). 
 
The category of “abstract ideas” thus reflects 
either functional properties on which claimed inven-
tions operate or results to be achieved by employing 
                                                     
55 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874). 
 
56 Id. at 507. 
 
57 Id. 
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those properties.58  For either, there must be inven-
tion in the application to establish eligibility.  This 
was made clear in Marconi Wireless Telegraph 
Company of America v. United States.59  The Court 
held that the abstract ideas of tuning a radio anten-
na circuit (which also was not new) and of substitut-
ing a known structure to better accomplish the 
tuning were not patent-eligible inventions.60 
“[M]erely making a known element of a known 
combination adjustable by a means of adjustment 
known to the art, when no new or unexpected result 
is obtained is not invention.”61  Marconi Wireless 
Telegraph not only demonstrates the eligibility 
requirement for a creative technological advance 
when applying a functional property or a result.  It 
also explains the precedents for claims to combina-
tions of elements that lack any significant new 
function.  Lacking any patent-eligible invention, 
such claims also lack any non-obvious invention.62 
                                                     
58 See, e.g., Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175 (explaining that 
invention does not exist in the discovery of motivating powers 
or properties, but “in applying them to useful objects”); id. (“A 
patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain 
process, as that would prohibit all other persons from making 
the same thing by any means whatsoever.”).  
 
59 320 U.S. 1 (1943). 
 
60 See id. at 32–36, 49.  
 
61 Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
 
62 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415–17 (citing United 
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966), Anderson’s-Black Rock, 
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In the present case, the Court should affirm 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s rejection of 
Petitioners’ claims at issue.63  Those claims (wheth-
er or not restricted to a specified mathematical 
formula64) reflect only non-inventive applications of 
the abstract idea of hedging risk.  That result is 
achieved by the non-inventive process of having a 
middle-man enter into contracts that balance out 
uncertain sales amounts at fixed prices (like the 
slightly more common process of balancing uncertain 
prices for fixed amounts).  The claimed process: (1) 
lacks any creative, technological advance in any 
particular structure to implement it or in any tangi-
ble transformation that it achieves; and (2) is re-
stricted in its scope only by a field-of-use limitation 
to the context of commodity purchases.65  The claims 
                                                     
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969), and Sakraida 
v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976)). 
 
63 See U.S. Pat. App. No. 08/833,892. 
 
64 See Brief for the Petitioners at 7–8. 
 
65 See id. at 3-6; id. at 7 (Claim 1).  Nothing in Claim 1 is 
limited to energy supplies (or fluctuations in prices due to 
weather variations).  Nothing requires any particular method 
(including Monte-Carlo modeling) to determine the “fixed price” 
or the “fixed rate based on historical averages.”  Id. at 7.  See 
id. at 5–6.  Rather, the fixed price could be based on collected 
and averaged data from a particular consumer’s past use over 
some unspecified period of time, at a price the consumer is 
willing to accept.  Claim 4 (if before the Court) only limits 
Claim 1 to the field of energy commodities (where prices are 
sensitive to weather), and (possibly) to mathematically calcu-
lating the fixed price according to a formula with various data 
inputs (given that “determined by the relationship” could mean 
“reflects” and no calculation may be required).  Id. at 8.  If 
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lack any new discovery or invention at all, much less 
invention in the application of the abstract idea of 
hedging risk. This is true even though the claims do 
not preempt all applications of hedging and even if 
some claims may sometimes effectively require a 
general-purpose computer to do the math to imple-
ment them.66  This Court should bar these claims at 
the threshold. 
 
II.      Neither the Constitution Nor the Patent 
Act Authorizes Patents For Non-
Inventive Applications of  Science, 
Nature and Ideas. 
 
Before the end of the 18th Century, it was un-
equivocally recognized at English common law that 
scientific principles, naturally occurring materials, 
and abstract ideas were not susceptible to private 
ownership by patents granted under the Statute of 
Monopolies.67  Scientists who made such discoveries 
were morally obliged to freely disseminate that 
knowledge for social benefit.68  Once such discove-
                                                     
Claim 4 contains any creativity beyond Claim 1, it must lie in 
data gathering, which is not part of the claim, or in the ma-
thematical formula, which must be treated as prior art. 
 
66 Cf. id. at 7.  Claim 4 does not specify the iterations (i) in the 
formula, and thus may entail a trivial calculation if calculation 
is required, although data therefor may be difficult to obtain. 
 
67 See, e.g., Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 667 (interpreting 21 Jac. 
1, c. 3, § 6 (1623)). 
 
68 See, e.g., 17 Parliamentary History, supra¸ at col. 999 
(scientists are “intrusted by Providence with the delegated 
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ries were disclosed in a patent application, they were 
required be treated as if they were already known.69  
If any invention existed to support a patent, it must 
therefore have been in the application of science, 
nature, and ideas.70  It was with these understand-
ings that the relevant constitutional and statutory 
provisions were enacted.  
 
                                                     
power of imparting to their fellow-creatures that instruction 
which heaven meant for universal benefit; they must not be 
niggards to the world, or hoard up for themselves the common 
stock”); 1 Robinson, supra, at 39 (“To benefit by the discoveries 
of his fellow-men is thus not only a natural right, it is also the 
natural duty which every man owes to himself and to society; 
and the mutual, universal progress thence resulting is the 
fulfillment of the earthly destiny of the human race.”). 
 
69 See Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1273 (1841) 
(“We think the case must be considered as if, the principle being 
well known, the plaintiff had first invented a mode of applying 
it by a mechanical apparatus to furnaces; and his invention 
then consists in this [structural arrangement]....”) (emphasis 
added).  See also Flook, 437 U.S. at 592 & n.13 (citing, inter 
alia, O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 115, and Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 
707 (1880)). 
 
70 See Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 667 (Lord Eyre, C.J.) (“Un-
doubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle, but for a 
principle so far embodied and connected with corporeal sub-
stances as to be in a condition to act and to produce effects in 
any art, trade, mystery, or manual occupation, I think there 
may be a patent); id. at 663 (Buller, J.) (“But then it was said, 
that though an idea or a principle alone would not support the 
patent, yet that an idea reduced into practice, or a practical 
application of the principle was a good foundation for a patent, 
and was the present case.”). 
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Nothing in the Constitution’s record or in the 
contemporaneous statutory enactments suggests any 
intent to depart from the deeply held English belief 
that science, nature, and ideas could not be patented 
because they were to be free to all for use.71  Judicial 
decisions from the early 19th Century interpreting 
the Patent Act unequivocally state this restriction on 
patentable subject matter.72  Judicial decisions and 
treatises from later in the century emphatically 
repeat the point, treating the constitutional and 
statutory language as limited to inventions.73   
The earliest explicit statement to this effect by 
this Court is in the second half of the 19th Century, 
in Le Roy v. Tatham:  “A principle, in the abstract, is 
                                                     
71 See, e.g., Walterscheid, Study, supra, at 309–27, 348–51 
(discussing the evidence from the records of the Constitution 
and the 1790 and 1793 Acts). 
 
72 See, e.g., Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019 (“It has been often 
decided, that a patent cannot be legally obtained for a mere 
philosophical or abstract theory.”).  “Philosophical” was then 
understood to mean pertaining to the natural sciences.  See, 
e.g., The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 180 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1971). 
 
73 See, e g., In re Kemper, 14 F.Cas. 286, 287 (C.C.D. D.C. 1841) 
(No. 7,687) (“‘Invention differs from discovery.’...  A discovery, 
in this sense, is not the subject of a patent; and it will be found, 
by a careful perusal of the constitution and laws of the United 
States upon the subject of patents for useful arts, &c., that it is 
not there used in this sense, but always as synonymous with 
invention.”) (citing Webster’s dictionary); Albert H. Walker, 
Text-book of the Patent Laws of the United States of America 2 
(2d ed. 1889) (“The word ‘discovery’ does not have either in the 
Constitution or the statute, its broadest signification.  It means 
invention, in those documents, and in them it means nothing 
else.”). 
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a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; 
these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in 
either of them an exclusive right.”74  O’Reilly re-
peated the point, and made clear that such new 
discoveries were to be treated (as in England) as if 
they were publicly known.75  And by the middle of 
the 20th Century, Funk Brothers Seed Co. clarified 
that “[i]f there is to be invention from such a discov-
ery, it must come from the application of the law of 
nature to a new and useful end.”76  Congress revised 
Section 101 shortly thereafter, without changing the 
requirement for invention in the application. 
 
A. The Changes Made in the 1952 
Patent Act Did Not Alter the 
Invention in the Application Test. 
 
In Section 101, Congress recodified without 
relevant change the statutory eligibility language 
that was then in existence, while making certain 
specific changes to the definitions in Section 100.77  
Congress thus preserved the judicial interpretations 
that had been developed, except to the extent they 
were affected by the definitional changes.78  Section 
                                                     
74 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175. 
 
75 See 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 115–16 (quoting Neilson). 
 
76 333 U.S. at 130.   
 
77 See, e.g., H.R. Rept. 82-1928, at 6 (1952) 
 
78 See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) (ratification is implied when 
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100 of the Patent Act defined “invention” to include 
“invention or discovery” without substantive change, 
so as to simplify the statute’s language.79  Section 
101 also changed the archaic term “art” to “process,” 
and Section 100 defined “process” to include both 
“method” and “new uses of a known” product or 
process.80  These changes made clear (as this Court’s 
cases had held) that processes and new uses were 
potentially eligible, but did not affect the exclusions 
for science, nature, and ideas nor alter the require-
ment for invention to exist in their application.81 
 
In particular, the addition of the “new use” 
provision reversed earlier appellate cases suggesting 
that inventive creativity could never exist in apply-
ing an old structure or process to a new use.82  The 
                                                     
Congress “reenacts statutory language that has been given a 
consistent judicial construction”). 
 
79 See, e.g., Pasquale J. Federico, Commentary on the New 
Patent Act, 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 161, 175 (1993) 
(1954) (explaining that the old statute used “invention or 
discovery” in many places; the new definition allowed use of the 
singular “invention”). 
 
80 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(a) & (b), 101.  See H.R. Rept. 82-1928, at 6. 
 
81 See, e.g., H.R. Rept. 82-1928, at 6; Riesenfeld, supra, at 301 
(explaining that “it must not be concluded that the well estab-
lished rule which excludes the mere discovery of natural laws 
and phenomena or the scientific explanation of the operation of 
known devices or processes from the realm of patentable 
inventions has lost its recognition”). 
 
82 See, e.g., Howe, 12 F. Cas. at 658.  But cf. Ansonia Brass & 
Copper Co., 144 U.S. at 18. 
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issue was brought to legislative attention by In re 
Thuau, which had deemed new uses of existing 
products to be beyond the statutory language—as 
not a new art—even though the new use was inven-
tive.83  However, in rejecting the Thuau doctrine 
and its extreme prohibition on patenting inventive 
new uses, Congress did not adopt the opposite ex-
treme position of authorizing patents for non-
inventive new uses.84  Nothing in the history indi-
cates any intent to alter the requirement for inven-
tion in the application.  Accordingly, since enactment 
of Section 100(b), this Court has consistently af-
                                                     
 
83 See Riesenfeld, supra, at 298 (citing Thuau, 135 F.2d at 
347). 
 
84 See, e.g., id. at 299–300 (“[T]he background of the amend-
ment gives reason to assume that a newly discovered use for a 
known substance, machine or process is still only patentable if 
it is not merely analogous or cognate to the uses heretofore 
made....  [I]t is fair to state that in essence the new statutory 
definition of ‘process’ restores the broad principles of patenta-
bility flowing from a careful analysis of the exposition given by 
the Supreme Court in the Ansonia case.”); Federico, supra, at 
177–78 (“The reference to the new use of a known machine or 
manufacture in the definition [in Section 100(b)] merely means 
that processes may utilize old machines or manufactures and 
the reference to the new use of a known process simply indi-
cates that the procedural steps in a patentable process might 
be old.”).  Cf. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 144 U.S. at 18 (“[I]f 
an old device or process be put to a new use, which is not 
analogous to the old one, and the adaptation of such process to 
the new use is of such a character as to require the exercise of 
inventive skill to produce it, such new use will not be denied the 
merit of patentability.”) (emphasis added).   
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firmed the requirement for invention in any applica-
tion of science, nature, and ideas. 
 
B. Interpreting the Patent Act to 
Authorize Patents for Non-
Inventive Applications Would 
Conflict With the Limits in the 
Constitution. 
 
Interpreting Section 101 of the Patent Act—by 
itself or in light of Section 273(b)85—so broadly as to 
authorize eligibility of non-inventive applications 
would conflict with this Court’s consistent statutory 
interpretation that science, nature, and ideas are 
unpatentable.  It also would raise serious constitu-
tional conflicts that should be avoided.86 Patent 
eligibility for non-inventive applications of science, 
nature, and ideas would conflict with the constitu-
tional premise that patents should issue only for 
“Discoveries” of “Inventors.”87  Similarly, such broad 
eligibility would conflict with the limitation of the 
                                                     
85 35 U.S.C. § 273(b).  When enacting Section 273(b), Congress 
expressed its concern over the effects of the Federal Circuit’s 
new and expansive interpretation.  See, e.g., Cong. Rec. S14836 
(Nov. 18, 1999).  By enacting a separate restriction to limit 
those effects, Congress neither approved of the broad eligibility 
language of State Street Bank nor ratified that new test of 
eligibility. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292 
(2001); Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517, 532 (1994). 
 
86 See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989); 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 
(1936). 
 
87 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
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patent system to human creativity in the “useful 
Arts,”88 and would impede rather than “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”89 
 
As discussed in the Court of Appeals by some 
of the Amici here,90 and in other amicus briefs filed 
in this Court, all three constitutional limits are 
exceeded when patents issue for non-inventive 
applications of science, nature, and ideas.  As dis-
cussed above, such claims directly conflict with the 
Constitution’s limit to “Discoveries” of “Inventors.”  
Further, as this Court held in Graham v. John Deere 
Co., the patent power is “limited to the promotion of 
advances in the ‘useful arts,’” and Congress may not 
“enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the 
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained 
thereby.”91  Patents on non-inventive applications 
lack any creative, technological advance, and thus 
cross whatever line marks the border of the useful 
arts.  Similarly, lacking the quid pro quo of disclosed 
technological advance, such patents create odious 
                                                     
88 Id.  See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Advanced Study 
and Research in Intellectual Property (CASRIP) and Research 
Affiliate Scholars at 12-20 (discussing the limits of the “useful 
Arts”). 
 
89 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  See generally Suzanne Scot-
chmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative 
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 29 (1991) 
(discussing the effects of patents on sequential innovation). 
 
90 See Brief of Amici Curiae Ten Law Professors, In re Bilski, 
Appeal No. 2007-1130 (Fed. Cir.), at 6–10. 
 
91 383 U.S. at 5–6. 
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monopolies and impede, rather than promote, scien-
tific and technological progress.92 
 
Such a broad interpretation of Section 101 
would seriously and adversely affect innovation.  
Without invention in the application, patents would 
foreclose many (even if they do not preempt all) uses 
of scientific discoveries, including uses in further 
scientific and technological research.  Eligibility for 
such claims would reward too little invention (or 
would impermissibly reward scientific discovery), 
while burdening too much sequential scientific 
discovery and technological invention. 
 
The adverse effects on further scientific and 
technological development are particularly salient in 
light of the Court of Appeals recent expansive inter-
pretation of the statutory infringement right to deny 
a meaningful exception for scientific experiments.93  
In contrast, science, nature, and ideas are the infra-
structure for technological and other progress, and 
either sufficient incentives already exist or there are 
                                                     
92 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 
U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (the patent laws reflect a “careful balance” 
between promoting innovation and permitting imitation); 
Walterscheid, Study, supra, at 31–58 (discussing the anti-
monopoly origins of the patent power under English and 
colonial law); 1 Robinson, supra, at 51-52 (distinguishing 
patents from odious monopolies in that the technological 
advance supplies the rights that the public would otherwise 
enjoy). 
 
93 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
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better alternatives for society than patents for the 
discovery of such infrastructure.94 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should 
affirm the rejection of the patent claims at issue and 
hold that patent eligibility requires invention in the 
application of any previously known or newly discov-
ered science, nature, or ideas. 
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94 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Ten Law Professors, at 11 
n.20. 
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